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C.D. Herrera

Two arguments for ‘covert methods’ in social
research

ABSTRACT
In some ‘covert’ participant–observation studies, social researchers defend their
omission of informed consent on the basis of a need to protect subjects from
apprehension, nervousness, or even criminal prosecution. In other instances,
researchers contend that deception is rampant in society, and that their methods
are no more immoral than the behaviour that ordinarily prevails. These defenses
of covert methods fail to appreciate the range of risks that may be involved, and
in the latter case, fail to show that these methods are in fact morally indistinguishable from the ‘deception’ that people typically engage in. Ultimately, these
proposed defenses of covert methods succeed only in arousing greater concern
about informed consent in social research, and the researcher’s privilege in
bypassing it.
KEYWORDS: Research ethics; covert methods; participant–observation;
 eldwork; informed consent

OVERVIEW OF THE MORAL PROBLEM

It is a truism in  eldwork that there is often only apparent separation
between the honest, open study and the ‘covert’ or deceptive one. This
holds true because social research, particularly  eldwork, exhibits a continuum of concealment and disclosure. For some researchers, the tension
between these two may be part of the appeal. Still, it is an appeal best tempered by moral caution. After all, even the best of intentions cannot preclude doubts about the researcher’s conduct. It is important that, when
doubts arise, the dif culty in knowing where the transition between the
open and the covert occurs should not be taken as proof that the distinction is illusory.
We can safely describe some  eld studies as covert. In one example, a
researcher might feign alcoholism and join a recovery group, using the
meeting time to record the interaction of the members. Her carefully
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tailored behaviour would include the fostering of false beliefs in her
cohorts. Another researcher might secretly record the conversations of his
co-workers at a restaurant where they work. His research may originally have
been separate from his occupation. Yet at some point researchers who go
covert look upon af liations at the workplace, the campus, or the organization as enticing  eld studies, and the subjects are never the wiser. This is
research that exploits naive trust, and where data-collection relies on a
‘cover’ story. Far from being open in any meaningful sense, studies like this
are predicated on the omission of informed consent. This makes it irresponsible to pass them off as being at the moral ‘gray areas’.1
Arguments defending covert research usually follow vaguely utilitarian
lines. The idea is that whatever risks covert methods might involve are
offset, or balanced, by the bene ts that follow from the research. The
promise is one of a net gain. This is for the most part an acceptable course,
except that some arguments provide more casual references to the ‘greater
good’ and the balancing act than they do elaboration on the terms of the
trade-off. This is especially true of two arguments that I will examine.
FOR THE GOOD OF THE SUBJECTS

One argument cites the principle of non-malecence, expressed as the restriction against negatively affecting those under observation. It holds that a
researcher who seeks informed consent can disturb subjects who may object
to participation, or the researcher’s mere presence. Accordingly, this argument contends that covert methods shield the subjects and their activities.2
A wedding, we might imagine, could take a turn for the worse if a ‘guest’
announced that he was really a graduate student gathering information for
a thesis. Regardless of whether the research could continue after the confession, the damage would have been done to the subjects and setting. With
the wedding delayed or ruined entirely, risk accrues to the utilitarian calculus. As the aspiring ethnographer was ushered out, so too would any
possibility of bene ts from the research. In this scenario covert methods
look like the preventative and informed consent the intrusion.
The shielding aspects of covert methods seem so taken for granted that
the literature contains more reports of minimizing ‘awareness’ of the
undesirable kind than it does moral inquiry into the implications that this
raises. For instance, when openly requesting private details is out of the
question, one commentator recommends that researchers adopt methods
of the under-cover criminal investigator (Shulman 1994). This is undeniably practical advice. Criminals are not the only ones who might become
agitated on learning that they are subjects of  eld study. Then again, the
fact that people are typically reluctant to perform as subjects is sometimes
treated as a secondary risk. As another researcher points out, covert
methods can keep that select few subjects from turning hostile and possibly
dangerous (Wolf 1991). He tells of covert methods that protected the
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subjects from upset and of secrecy that protected him from physical harm.
The ethnographer had, in this case, chosen to covertly study an ‘outlaw’
motorcycle gang. Still another researcher provides proof of what can
happen when predicted risks actualize (Leo 1995). When his subjects
caught on, they grew suf ciently incensed to subpoena his  eldnotes. This
time the setting was a police interrogation room, which the researcher had
chosen to covertly observe.
Vignettes like these accord with the notion that seeking informed
consent and pausing to explain research objectives are luxuries of the
laboratory. In  eldwork, informed consent can prove impractical, dangerous, or generally disruptive. This should not be confused with the popular
argument that covert methods are in the researcher’s best interest. The
argument here inclines towards paternalism: researchers go undercover
primarily for the subjects’ bene t. In theory, it is an argument that applies
wherever researchers can link their omission of informed consent with their
need to ‘protect’ the subjects.3
RISK AND COVERT METHODS

As hard as it is to overstate the value of non–malecence, this principle provides dubious support for covert methods. It is especially odd to envision
informed consent, a quasi-legal protection for human subjects, actually
harming them. Much of the confusion issues from the account of risk.
There is, for example, an obvious risk that people might not appreciate
the researcher’s attention. But keeping them in the dark does not eliminate that risk. Conventional wisdom holds that researchers can prevent subjects from knowing that the research is taking place, and can later disguise
details when reporting their results. Actual practice reveals that pseudonyms and other disguises can fail. People can then recognize themselves as
subjects, and people who were never involved can resemble the  ctionalized characters. In one illustration of just how complex the layers of risk
can get, subjects grew irate not so much because they had been studied
without their consent, but because the researcher had disguised their identities in ways that they didn’t like ( Jacobs 1987). Researchers who combine
initial deception with later falsi cation may only complicate the risks and
the moral problem. At best, they trade one risk for another.
As much as seeking consent can involve risks, bypassing consent will
simply give rise to risks of a different kind. The control over risks related to
bypassing consent hangs tenuously on an assumption that subjects will
remain naive, based on the idea that ‘what they don’t know won’t hurt
them’. But the potential for ‘hurt’ subjects derives from the decision to use
covert methods. This means that researchers who see moral victory in not
disturbing subjects are in reality solving problems of their own devising.4
That is, if, as advocates for covert research allege, people are leery of
research, why ignore the risk that these people might learn that they have
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been fooled into participating in it none the less? This approach threatens
to compound the subject’s insult with injury. Given the dif culty in
responding to or predicting subject reactions, the risks that could follow
from using covert methods seem less manageable than we are led to
believe. 5
Even incomplete or inaccurate information about their participation can
have negative effects on the subjects. Some subjects may discover their
involvement, and wrongly think that they understand it, when it is too late
or uncomfortable for researchers to provide clari cation. No matter when
the cover story fails, subjects may become disturbed merely by  nding out
that they were chosen for social research if they (perhaps unfairly) view this
as the study of the deviant or the unusual. (‘There must be a reason why
those researchers chose me. . . .’) If they only learn of their naivete, subjects
receive an unwelcome lesson. It is again hard to see why such risks would
count less than the risk that the subjects might refuse to sign a consent
form.
The strongest point against this argument is that, even if we grant that
researchers can keep their work secret, covert methods still may not offer
an acceptable mediation between risk and bene t. This is because it is not
essential that the subjects recognize that they have been taken in. Discussion of research methods traditionally denes ‘risk’ solely in terms of
physical and emotional effects.6 But research can harm subjects who remain
unaware, or who show no noticeable, immediate effects (Cassell 1978,
1982). Consider the risks that reputations are vulnerable to
If someone spreads a libelous description of me . . . I have been injured
in virtue of the harm done to my interest in a good reputation, even
though I never learn what has happened. . . . I have an interest . . . in
having a good reputation . . . and that interest can be seriously harmed
without my ever learning of it (Feinberg 1977: 306).
By the same token, covert methods can infringe on interests that people
hold concerning research participation, and the sharing of private details
(Reece and Siegal 1986, Sagarin 1973). The risk remains whether or not
subjects ever understand the extent of their involvement.
Of concern here are not idiosyncratic or unrealistic preferences that
might hinder relatively harmless studies. It is wholly reasonable for potential subjects to be interested in keeping details of their lives from the
researcher’s notepad (as much as some might be  attered by the attention).
This interest covert methods cannot accommodate. While risks directly
attributable to informed consent pose a methodological challenge, why
make subjects pay for the researcher’s lack of methodological imagination?
Why extend the researcher’s privilege to judgments about which interests
are reasonable, or which interests subjects ought to hold?
There are more general questions raised by the apparent incommensurability between the risks of seeking and bypassing consent. What correlation is there between the risk of upsetting a private function and the risk
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of there being no account of that function in a published article, academic
lecture, or social policy? How can researchers make good on their claims
about bene ts outweighing risks over time? Commentators tend to dwell
only on the immediate risks and bene ts of a study. Overlooked is the ongoing, utilitarian commitment that follows from the decision to use covert
methods. Promises to protect subjects and supply knowledge carry no
identi able ‘expiration date’. They prescribe no endpoint, in other words,
where the researcher can ignore the welfare of the subjects as it relates to
the study.
The evolving response to the covert study of ‘Cornerville’ over 50 years
ago reveals how what once seemed innocuous may today seem questionable, if not invasive (cf. Boelen 1992, Whyte 1992). How would we prove
that the knowledge provided studies like this continues to outweigh the
reactions of the subjects, to the degree that we even know what those reactions are? Our interpretation of what counts as risk and bene t is necessarily selective. It differs depending on when we tally the score and who we
were to ask.7 Any assessment also re ects beliefs about what constitutes
proper treatment of subjects. These beliefs are in turn based on what we
believe researchers can do, and what those who become subjects have a
right to expect. The actions of researchers themselves can affect our understanding of the utilitarian balance. Researchers can develop doubts about
a particular approach, shelve their project, or lose funding in the  nal
stages (Bulmer 1982a). When that happens, bene ts that may have
appeared only marginally valuable to subjects might not materialize at all
(Gans 1982, Graves and Shield 1991). This has the practical effect of undermining claims about offsetting the risks of covert research.
On a more philosophical level, we may lack a large piece of the puzzle
until we can clarify why researchers have to protect the subjects in the  rst
place. There is in the social science literature occasional talk of subject
autonomy, but this is platitude unless it coheres with the utilitarian scheme
for covert methods. Likewise, mention of respect rings hollow in the
absence of a strategy for respecting people while deceiving or observing
them without consent. In the end, this  rst argument for covert methods
rests on a  awed assessment of the risks involved, and an overly optimistic
picture of the researcher’s ability to control those risks. Most importantly,
this argument does not reconcile the need to protect subjects with the likelihood of infringing on their interests.
PERVASIVE DECEPTION

A second argument asserts that covertness is pervasive and unavoidable in
human communication. So-called ‘covert’ methodology would thus mimic
interaction that occurs naturally. For this reason, some advocates think that
critics worry too much, certainly more than their subjects do, about deception and misrepresentation (e.g. Goode 1996). Even the seemingly
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innocuous survey, they claim, relies on the kind of unannounced cues and
in uences that shape everyday conversation (e.g. Rockwood, et al. 1997,
Roth 1969).
Apologists for covert methods draw several related conclusions from
these empirical claims. First, researchers are hardly the only ones concealing things, and ‘the proper question is not whether wearing a mask is unethical (since no mask is any more real than any other), but rather, which mask
should be worn?’ Where researchers ‘assume a variety of masks, or selves,
depending on where they  nd themselves (the classroom, the of ce, the
 eld). . . , [w]ho is to say which of these are disguised and which are real?’
(Denzin 1989: 262).8 Apparently, the question is not so much whether a
study is covert, but how covert it is. Second, we usually do not announce
our intentions upon greeting each other (could we expect an honest
response?), it is unfair to require researchers to do anything more. Why
force those who study crowd behaviour, for instance, to seek informed
consent, when ‘people watchers’ do not have to (e.g. Homan 1980)? The
onus is on ‘critics of covert methods’ to show ‘why social research should
be expected to conform to standards not honored elsewhere’ (Homan
1991: 114, Reynolds 1972, 1982).
By claiming only that ‘all human beings are social researchers’ (Douglas
1979: 28), this argument leaves open the possibility that something may be
troubling about covert methods, and that more honest alternatives exist.
This argument does not claim, in other words, that only covert methods will
work. Instead, covert methods are supposed to be no worse than other
forms of engagement, because they rely on the non-researcher’s tactics.
Covert methods are portrayed as the researcher’s attempts to turn the
prevalence of subterfuge to the bene t of social inquiry.
To that end, advocates of covert methods note our ability to detect subtle
cues when we interact. We determine, for example, the limits of acceptable
humour in a particular setting, when we are getting on with someone, and
so on, all without requesting explicit con rmation. Covert researchers
maintain that they can in a similar way detect implicit or ‘tacit’ consent from
their subjects. People consent through their actions (or inactions), which
suggests that we consent to much more than we realize, by virtue of basic
association.9
Humphreys (1975) defended his covert study of sex acts in public lavatories by combining the strands of this argument. He claimed that he didn’t
openly advertise his true interests in the rest rooms because the subjects
gave tacit consent. They had, it seems, trusted him enough to ask that he
signal when a stranger approached. ‘In that setting,’ Humphreys maintained,
I misrepresented my identity no more than anyone else. Furthermore,
my activities were intended to gain entrance not to a ‘private domain’,
but to a public rest room. The only sign on the door said ‘Men’, which
makes me quite eligible for entering. (Humphreys 1975: 171)10
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Later, Humphreys traced the addresses of a handful of these patrons from
their motor vehicle records. In disguise, he visited their homes to ask questions about their economic status, among other things. Presumably, those
who answered (and who owned cars) implicitly consented to this phase of
the research as well.
Again, the originality in this argument lies in what it does not claim.
There is no denial of the contentious aspects of covert  eldwork. The argument holds instead that pervasive deception makes these methods ordinary, that the researcher is for all appearances doing what everyone
suspects. And, as in Humphreys’ study, subjects can hardly claim to be
strangers to deception.11 Despite researchers tending to disassociate themselves from Humphreys’ study today, this underlying logic persists. In an
altogether different setting, another sociologist (Homan 1992) conducted
covert research in a religious congregation. He noted that an ‘All are
Welcome’ sign was posted at the rear of the church.12
DECEPTION AND DISTINCTIONS

The empirical claims that this argument draws on sound overstated and
possibly irrelevant. That deception is rampant or accepted entails nothing
about the morality of covert methods, unless one is proven equivalent to
the other. That equivalence seems unlikely, since people typically do not
expect to encounter researchers when they interact. (And some researchers
go to great lengths to cloak their professional identities.) It is of little use
then to note that honesty is not the rule if public morality and mutual
(dis)trust are not at issue. At issue is the researcher’s behaviour, and the
idea that it is unexceptional. To resolve this, what needs establishing is the
claim that people who occasionally deceive consider covert methods just
another form of deception.
Proving this may not be easy, in the light of empirical evidence to the
contrary. It appears that people qualify their acceptance of deception (if
acceptance it is), and adjust their reservations according to perceptions
about the deceiver’s motive and status, for instance (Hyman 1989, Depaulo,
et al. 1985). This allows the liar and the listener to draw the line somewhere.
The much-caricatured car salesman, who may wantonly cheat Aunt Edna,
can still take a dim view of being paid in counterfeit money. And even in
rampant dishonesty, people can abide by rules of engagement as they
morally navigate through the values they attach to their actions.
Once more, covert methods do not simplify anything; they amplify the
dif culties in knowing how people evaluate trust and openness in their
everyday affairs (O’Connor and Barnes 1983). The charitable approach
would assume that people are likely to distinguish between concealing the
true intent of questions and concealing the fact that the questions are part
of research. This would avoid the hand-wringing claim that researchers are
merely swept up in the subterfuge that others initiate. Why not assume that
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subjects are astute enough to tell one kind of deception from another, and
that their distinctions are worth respecting? ‘How shocked sociologists
would be’, one commentator adds, ‘if some famous ethnographic informant, with an honoured status in the literature, turned out to have
been another social scientist, working under cover’ (Bulmer 1982c: 642, cf.
Barnes 1979).
Because participation in covert research is exceptional, researchers,
when they operate as such, distance themselves from the rest of the group.
Whatever their previous status, the researchers become special members of
the communities they observe. When they go from bona de member to
member-conducting-research they set themselves apart from the group’s
interests (barring a eld study that focuses on covert researchers). Indeed,
covert methods are only useful where legitimate membership in a community does not require an interest in conducting research. If the
researcher’s presence in a group is truly based on values that the group
members share, and the research behaviour is indistinguishable from the
group’s, why resort to covert methods?13
The same reasoning applies to the claim that researchers can deduce
what subjects tacitly consent to. If cues are so trustworthy, why not openly
offer the consent form? Agreeing to talk may, using a liberal interpretation,
indicate a vague ‘consent’. Whether it signals consent to  eldwork is less
obvious. In Humphreys’ study, his being asked to perform a group role
seems to be an explicit indication that he was trusted, and it seems unlikely
that the trust was based on a belief that Humphreys was planning to write
a report on things happening in general. As for the idea that consent is presumed where it is not explicitly refused, this is analogous to concluding that
ghosts must exist because skeptics have yet to prove that they do not.
Physicians impose emergency treatment on patients who sometimes have
only given tacit or presumed consent. The high degree of public trust and
privilege that supports this goes hand-in-hand with the physician’s accountability for any misjudgment of the patient’s interests. The physician’s
actions also must bene t those who do not (or cannot) ‘consent’, and there
must be a presumption of harm if no treatment is provided.14 Social
researchers can claim neither urgency nor accountability for their tacit
consent. Once some subjects learn of their participation, it is too late for
researchers to consider what they might have consented to, and what might
have been in their best interests. As in the case of physicians, the issue may
reduce to privilege, and whether researchers should be given the authority
to determine, before their subjects do, when consent is given.
In summary, this argument fails to substantiate the claim that covert
methods offer the best compromise between risk and benet. Claims that
covert methods involve no more risks than ordinary interaction seem to
require that we make an unwarranted assumption about how ‘ordinary’
covert methods are. This disparity also weakens claims about researchers
being able to detect ‘consent’ through ordinary means of non-verbal, and
sometimes verbal, behaviour. There is reason to wonder if researchers are
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detecting precisely what they want to, aside from what subjects believe. Even
if it happens that some subjects later admit that they did not mind participating in covert research, this does not validate the moral claim that
researchers were doing nothing exceptional at the time, or that they
somehow knew what the subjects were willing to do.
THE SCOPE OF INFORMED CONSENT

There is certainly room for inter-disciplinary comparison when we discuss
tacit consent. In medicine and social research, for example, there is reason
to wonder how informed and consensual ‘informed consent’ truly is.
Regrettably, such comparisons too often end with non-committal remarks
about how uncertain and dynamic social research settings are, and how
inappropriate informed consent is (e.g. Fine 1993, Gjessing 1968, Sanadjian 1990).15 Some social researchers argue that informed consent is ponderous, and better protects the subjects of medical research than  eldwork
(e.g. Thorne 1980, Wax 1995).
These arguments for disciplinary exemption obscure an important historical lesson. Risk to subjects is nearly always contingent on their participation.16 Informed consent does not eliminate risk, as we have seen. It does,
however, give the subjects control over their participation, and an added
degree of control over perceived risks. The presumption against
researchers has historical grounding, in as much as naive, vulnerable
researchers are rarely abused at the hands of institutionally backed, better
educated subjects.
Medical researchers confront deceptive, manipulative subjects, even subjects unable to evaluate their alternatives (Sloane and Resnick 1993). Nevertheless, few physicians since the Nuremberg Code have questioned the
need for volunteer subjects or some form of choice (e.g. Appelbaum 1984,
Veatch 1995).17 Ultimately, we can wonder how well patients or subjects of
social research can be informed without abandoning informed consent,
and without allowing researchers to adopt the moral code of those they are
studying when it serves their interests (e.g. Barnes 1963).
A FEW CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

These arguments for covert methods remain fashionable, no doubt,
because there is a grain of truth, even a common-sense appeal, in each one.
Who could argue that the subjects should be disturbed in the course of
research if this disruption can be avoided? Who hasn’t shown reserve when
describing personal details, or exaggerated a bit in conversation? Yet these
arguments fail on closer inspection to provide logical closure. It doesn’t
seem so clear, for example, that researchers are compelled to engage in
 eldwork, and that the options are either disturb or conceal. They don’t
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have to conduct the study at all. Were there some obligation to provide
knowledge, this would still not prove the morality of (or the necessity for)
covert methods. Covert research is also not, on re ection, so much like the
conversations that we casually engage in. On the contrary, covert research
raises a unique problem: those closest and most vital to the ‘conversation’
are valuable only so long as they know less about it than anyone else.
(Date accepted: November 1998)

C.D. Herrera
Biomedical Ethics Unit
McGill University

NOTES

1. There are certainly gray areas in this
area of research ethics. Dingwall (1980)
adequately surveys the troublesome cases
where often the key challenge is telling a
covert study from an open one.
2. Non-utilitarian moral defenses are
rare, as Adams (1981) explains, partly
because Kantian and contractualist
defenses do not provide favourable positions on covert research.
3. Non-maleficence would in fact preclude any research that had negative
effects, such as the prosecution of subjects.
In that case, however, the omission of
informed consent would not be at issue so
much as the dissemination of the  ndings.
4. Covert methods might leave
researchers vulnerable without there
being any corresponding protection for
the subjects. Researchers who act as
‘pseudo-patients’ risk receiving unnecessary and dangerous medical treatment, for
instance (Bulmer 1982b).
5. Davis (1993) and Greenberg (1993),
in When They Read What We Write, are especially insightful on the complexity of anticipating risks.
6. One can  nd a similar position on
research risk in discussions on experimental psychology (cf. Korn 1997 and
Baumrind 1979, 1985).
7. As Warwick (1982) argues, the standard utilitarian argument can only encompass risks and benefits that are easily
quantifiable, or that fit a pattern of
researcher expectation. To this we might
add that there is special difficulty in

knowing what risks are involved in the
adoption of the utilitarian position, as
opposed to another moral standpoint.
8. This is a restatement of Denzin’s
earlier views in Bulmer (1982c).
9. Some contend that people who
engage in morally suspect or illegal acts
somehow forfeit their right to voluntarily
consent. While such claims are distinct
from the argument here, one wonders
about the wisdom of letting social
researchers determine which behaviours
disqualify people for moral consideration.
10. A few of Humphreys’ subjects surmised the truth, though their ‘truth’ may
not have approximated his. Cahill (1985)
observed more conventional rest room
behaviour, and appealed to a kind of presumed consent, as did Middlemist et al.
(1977).
11. This research was also said to bene t
gay men, a claim consistent with the paternalistic emphasis.
12. In fairness, I should note that
Homan admits to some misgivings about
his methods.
13. Erikson’s (1967, 1996) question is
more basic: why suppose that members of
a society would welcome additional deception?
14. In addition, tacit consent applies
only to therapy, not medical research
(Beauchamp and Childress 1994). Interestingly, some social researchers place the
burden on subjects to show why they
should not be researched (e.g. Rainwater
and Pittman 1967). They see social
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research as an investigative discipline that
leaves everyone a potential subject, regardless of interests. This is a novel interpretation of informed consent, interesting for
its awareness of the range of risk-bene t
considerations, including the public good
as well as subject welfare (e.g. Deloria
1980).
15. A position that commonly surfaces
in handbooks on the ethics of social
research (cf. Diener and Crandall 1978,
Greenberg and Folger 1988).
16. See esp. Katz (1992). Levine (1986)
provides a survey of the notorious
examples from this history.
17. I thank anonymous reviewers for
their suggestions on an earlier version of
this paper.
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